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Solving the Fermi paradox without assumptions*
Berezin Alexander
Abstract—This paper suggests that a universal solu-
tion to the Fermi paradox exists and can be derived
directly from the definition of life and/or intelligence,
therefore eliminating the need for any questionable
assumptions and even for the anthropic principle. The
proposed solution1 puts an upper limit on growth of
civilizations that is independent of resource availability
or biological factors.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly understood that infinite growth
is physically impossible on a finite planet [1].
However, at first glance, the known laws of physics
suggest no hard limits to growth for civilizations
that have the capability of interstellar travel, bar-
ring the speed of light and the total amount of
accessible energy in the Universe. This is where
the Fermi paradox appears.
Given even the most conservative estimations of
growth rate, a civilization moderately older than
humanity should have already left easily detectable
traces, or even populated the entire galaxy [2]. The
lack of such observations is usually explained by
suggesting that either the odds of a capable enough
civilization to appear are extremely low [3], or that
they necessarily destroy themselves or each other
[4].
This paper argues that there is, indeed, a uni-
versal internal limit to growth of civilizations,
even without any external limiting factors. Another
way of putting this conclusion is to say that any
technology that permits any civilization to leave a
noticeable signature on a stellar scale inherently
presents an existential risk in the sense that it can
(and inevitably will) be used to permanently and
drastically curtail the potential of said civilization
[5].
*This work was not supported by any organization.
1A more colloquial name for this solution emerged during its
discussion: “the Black attractor”.
II. MODEL
In order to discuss the Fermi paradox, at least
one definition has to be agreed upon: usually it
is either life, intelligence or civilization. However,
making distinctions between these concepts may in
itself be an unwarranted assumption. In principle,
it is possible that some forms of life could evolve
the capability of interplanetary, or even interstellar
travel without evolving civilization, or even intelli-
gence, first. The distinction between unintelligent
and intelligent organisms does not have to be
discrete. Even the concept of an organism does
not have to retain its meaning for alien life.
In order to discourage the reader from mak-
ing assumptions based on colloquial definitions
of these terms, this paper will be referring to
“agents” as a generalization of all entities to which
the Fermi paradox is applicable.
At least three attempts at such a generalization
have been published. One is Erwin Schrodinger’s
“What Is Life?” [6], the second is “Equation of
intelligence” by Alexander Wissner-Gross [7], and
the third is “Free energy principle” by Karl Friston
[8].
Definition 2.1: [6] A system is considered alive
if it can decrease or maintain its internal entropy
by increasing the entropy of its surroundings.
Definition 2.2: [7] A system is considered in-
telligent if its actions aim at maximizing its future
freedom of action.
Definition 2.3: [8] A living system aims to min-
imize the dispersion of its sensed states, while
using those sensations to infer external states of
the world.
Proposition 2.4: The three definitions above are
equivalent at scales relevant to the Fermi paradox.
Proof: First, let us consider a system that
aims to maximize its future freedom of action.
As described in [7], when presented with a set
of possible action paths, such system will choose
the path that maximizes an average of short-
term directions weighted by the diversity of long-
term paths that they make reachable. However,
precise integration over long-term paths requires
full information about all factors that can possibly
affect the system, i.e. zero dispersion of sensed
states. As the dispersion increases, the precision
of path integration can only decrease. Therefore,
2.3 follows from 2.2.
Second, maintaining or decreasing the internal
entropy of a system requires continuous increase
in its external entropy. Hence, the system either
ceases being alive once its energy reservoir is
exhausted or seeks more energy in the external en-
vironment. And since any action increases entropy,
seeking more energy over long enough time is
equivalent to maximizing future freedom of action.
Therefore, 2.2 follows from 2.1.
Finally, as noted by Friston himself in [8],
“Under ergodic assumptions, the long-term aver-
age of surprise (a.k.a. “free energy”) is entropy”,
where “ergodicity means that the time average of
any measurable function of the system converges
(almost surely) over a sufficient amount of time”.
Considering the timescales relevant to the Fermi
paradox, we may conclude that 2.1 follows from
2.3.
Let agent be an entity that conforms to any one
of the equivalent definitions; and let A be the set
of all possible agents. A civilization is then defined
as an arbitrary nonempty subset of A.
III. SOLUTION
Proposition 3.1: Maximizing future freedom of
action is equivalent to hoarding the greatest
amount of resources.
Proof: Any action can be described as a com-
bination of movements. Movements from lower
to higher energy states2 expend energy. Any the-
oretically possible process of energy generation
expends some material resource as fuel. There-
fore, any action expends some fuel material, and
maximizing the amount of fuel also maximizes the
space of available actions.
Obviously, materials have more uses than just
fuel; they are required to sustain any type of
growth. However, if the most efficient reactor
possible converts any matter into energy with no
2The “energy state” here is used in the general sense and does
not imply the states are discrete.
waste products and any fuel can be converted
into some construction material, then the terms
“fuel” and “matter” can be used interchange-
ably. Consequently, as the efficiency of technology
approaches its theoretical maximum, correlation
between the value of resources and their physical
mass becomes more linear, meaning that value is
also interchangeable with mass.
At this point, a few more definitions should be
added for readability purposes.
Definition 3.2: An agent’s weight is the cumu-
lative value of resources that agent controls.
Definition 3.3: An α-agent is the one that has
the greatest weight in a civilization.
Proposition 3.4: Given long enough time, all
available value will be controlled by the α-agent.
Proof: Consider N agents each starting with
weight(n) = s− n ∗ ε , where s > 0 is an arbitrary
constant and ε is a minor perturbation: 0< ε << s.
Assume they invest all weight into obtaining more
value from space and their technological solutions
are equally efficient.
Reaching resources in space requires to change
one’s energy state. Since energy is equivalent to
value, the α-agent (with corresponding n= 0) will
be able to perform the greatest change of energy
state, and therefore gain access to the greatest
amount of new value. The α-agent now has a
weight proportional to s2, while other agents have
weight(n)∝ (s−nε)2. Repeating the same process
will result in agent n on step t having weight(n)∝
(s−nε)t .
lim
t→∞
st
∑
N
n=0(s−nε)
t
= 1
As t→ ∞, the fraction of value held by the α-
agent approaches 1, even assuming completely fair
competition. This means that all the available value
will at some point belong to the α-agent.
Proposition 3.5: If the number of agents in a
civilization is greater than one, they will be incen-
tivized to centralize storage of their value.
Proof: Since the definition of agents 2.2 does
not forbid them to steal from each other, such
behaviour is preferable when the value obtained
surpasses the value lost in the conflict (accord-
ing to 3.1). Knowing this, agents will attempt to
maximize the value that any other agent will lose
by attacking them while minimizing their own
expenditures on that task. Considering that the
value spent on defence of a region of space is
proportional to its surface area, while the value that
can be stored inside that region is proportional to
its volume, it now follows from basic geometry
that the optimal way to store value is within a
single spherical region.
Whether a civilization consisting of a single
agent can evolve to a scale significant to the Fermi
paradox is unclear. This paper does not cover such
a possibility.
Proposition 3.6: For every civilization of more
than one agent there exists an upper bound to the
amount of resources it can accumulate. Attempted
growth past that bound will result in a collapse
into a black hole.
Proof: According to 3.4, a disproportionate
amount of resources is controlled by a single agent.
According to 3.5, all these resources are packed
very closely. From here the problem is obvious.
A huge mass packed densely enough produces a
black hole.
IV. TESTABILITY
Usually testing a Fermi paradox solution pro-
posal would require observations of alien life (or
lack thereof), which makes the proposals essen-
tially untestable at present.
However, if 3.6 is true and extraterrestrial civi-
lizations had existed at some point in our galaxy,
we should be able to observe black holes left
by their collapse. Problem is, attributes of those
black holes depend on other unknown quantities,
so telling whether a specific body is a remnant of
a past civilization or a natural formation depends
entirely on context.
Basically, observing multiple black holes that do
not fit accepted astronomical models of star/galaxy
formation might be considered as weak evidence
for this hypothesis, and vice versa. Although ob-
serving black holes without prior knowledge of
their location is extremely difficult, it is suggested
in [9] that gravitational astronomy may change that
in near future.
V. DISCUSSION
A. How does this explain the absence of von
Neumann probes?
Definition 5.1: A von Neumann probe (VNP) is
an entity that aims to place at least one copy of
itself at the greatest number of stars in the shortest
time period.
Proposition 5.2: VNPs are agents.
Proof: It is fairly obvious that reducing the
time of interstellar flights requires increasing the
amount of resources spent by probes. Consider-
ing that resource extraction and replication are
relatively fast processes compared to interstellar
flights, VNPs are incentivized to gather as much
resources as possible before departing for the next
star. According to 3.1, this proves their agency.
Therefore, VNPs face the same problem as
civilizations, if they are not the same thing to begin
with. Whether VNPs are manned or autonomous is
irrelevant as long as they inherit the 2.2 property.
B. How does one even move such amounts of mass
for such distances in order to create a black hole?
We might not know yet what technologies are
going to be used for such large-scale projects;
what we can say definitively, though, is that the
laws of physics as we understand them are not the
limitation.
C. But if the collapse is so easy to predict, and
there is a sentient entity in control, that entity will
not allow it.
The key point is that no agent is actually in
control. Rather, the established system is in control
of the agents. A more intuitive example of such
a situation is the Prisoners’ dilemma [10]. The
same description can be applied to governments
accumulating advanced weapons that can never
be used, bankers’ behaviour preceding a financial
crash and the global response to climate change.
Generally speaking, there is no basis to claim
that systems consisting of rational agents also act
rationally.
D. But if the collapse is so easy to predict, surely
most individuals should be able to escape it?
Problem is, escaping the collapse requires es-
caping the gravity of the collapsing structure,
which would require exponentially more energy
as its mass increases; at the same time, the total
energy stored within it only grows linearly, and the
vast majority of individuals inhabiting it will not
possess any meaningful fraction of it according to
3.4.
On the other hand, some individuals might me
able to escape by sheer chance, and some will not
be caught in the collapsing region at all. However,
all wealth the civilization had accumulated is ir-
reversibly destroyed. Survivors have to start from
scratch. And when they finally manage to recreate
what was lost, history will simply repeat itself.
E. In a civilization consisting of billions or tril-
lions of individual agents, how can one of them
exercise so much power without the help of others?
If the agents on whom that one relies organize and
stage a revolt, they should be able to divide the
resources and avoid a collapse, shouldn’t they?
Proposition 5.3: The probability of successful
revolt against the α-agent decreases as the size
of civilization (in terms of cumulative value) in-
creases.
Proof: An ideal revolt is a conflict between
the α-agent and the sum of all other agents in
a given civilization. Assuming the defensive and
offensive systems do not need their own agency
to function, the outcome of a conflict is only
determined by the value that each side is able to
spend on it. According to 3.4, the fraction of value
held by the α-agent increases as civilization grows.
Eventually its weight will surpass that of all other
agents put together, at which point a successful
revolt is impossible.
It is, indeed, possible until then, but, once the
growth resumes, the same dynamic from 3.4 also
continues, eventually returning the value distribu-
tion to the same shape.
F. If agents are meant to maximize their future
freedom of action (2.2), why wouldn’t they factor
in the probability of a collapse?
Even if they do, this should not affect their
behavior. If they choose to suspend growth for
safety, another agent will exploit that, as explained
in 3.5. The risk will grow with time no matter
what they do. And, given the time scale that an
interstellar civilization needs for development, that
risk accumulates to a near certainty of collapse.
G. What if the civilization is forced to constantly
spend the resources they acquire?
That would protect the civilization itself from
a collapse. However, the only feasible condition
that ensures such spending is a war with another
civilization. Whether this is a better alternative to
collapse is up to the reader to decide.
H. Can the black holes resulting from collapsed
civilizations explain dark matter?
No. The idea of dark matter consisting of black
holes is currently not considered viable [11].
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. Assuming this solution is correct, what pre-
dictions can it make concerning the future of
humanity?
In the near future, private space industry should
grow dramatically. As already predicted in [12],
just the mining of near-Earth asteroids can bring
unprecedented profit in minerals that are rare in
Earth’s crust, but abundant in smaller celestial
bodies. That capital can then be invested into
even more ambitious projects requiring permanent
settlements in outer space, such as building solar
reflectors in Earth’s L1 point to decrease tempera-
ture and mitigate climate change; setting up high-
powered lasers to propel interstellar spacecraft [13]
or even curing aging as an indirect result of mod-
ifying humans for long-term exposure to micro-
gravity and radiation [14]. Slowly but inevitably,
engineering challenges that seem insurmountable
today will become real targets; challenges such as
gathering enough resources to collapse into a black
hole.
B. How can a civilization prevent its collapse?
Two ways have been suggested in V-E and V-G.
The third solution might come from the fact that
it is theoretically possible for few civilizations
to overcome their economic incentives. Even if
they themselves survive, other uncontrollably ex-
panding civilizations would still endanger their
existence. That should incentivize forcibly con-
straining younger civilizations, implementing “the
Zoo hypothesis” [15] in practice. Such scenario
does not permit unconstrained expansion either,
thus remaining an equally viable solution to the
Fermi paradox.
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